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Abstract
This paper analyzes the Baron and Myerson’s (B–M) (Econometrica 50: 911–930 [1982]) scheme
of monopoly regulation, a standard representative of Bayesian mechanisms. As is well known, the
B–M mechanism (and other related mechanisms) have as an explicit starting point the assumption
that the regulator has an unchallenged prior belief about the cost function of the regulated monopo-
list.We analyze here the consequences resulting from the possibility that this prior belief may be sub-
ject to influence or manipulable. As we show in detail, under the B–M scheme, consumers and the
regulated monopoly are highly sensitive to the regulator’s prior belief about the (private) cost infor-
mation of the monopolist. Therefore, if a regulator’s beliefs are unaccountable to and unverifiable by
a higher authority, the regulator has both the incentive and the possibility to change and/or misrepre-
sent his prior belief when facing pressure or payoffs from interest groups representing consumers or
the regulated firm. The results here show that the outcomes under a B–M mechanism favoring one
or another interest group can vary over a wide spectrum. The results are consistent with capture the-
ory and rent-seeking explanations of monopoly regulation and suggest the need to exercise care in
using the insights and results of Bayesian regulatory theory to inform practice.
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1. Introduction
In their famous paper Baron and Myerson (B–M) (1982) considered the problem
of regulating a monopolistic firm whose costs are unknown to the regulator. In
their setting marginal cost of production is constant and both the marginal and
fixed cost are assumed to be affine functions of the firm’s private parameter θ ,
which lies in a real interval [θ0, θ1]. The regulator is assumed to know the form
of the cost function and the interval [θ0, θ1] to which the unknown parameter θ is
known to belong. He also has a subjective prior belief about θ , represented by a
positive probability density function f (.) on [θ0, θ1]. Informationally, the demand
function is assumed to be known to the regulator as well as the firm.
The total social welfare is allowed to be any linear combination of consumers’
and producer’s surplus provided that the former is weighted at least as much as
the latter. The B–M mechanism consists of four components: quantity, price, prob-
ability of the firm being allowed to produce and subsidy. The outcome which the
B–M mechanism leads to depends properly upon the regulator’s prior belief as well
as the true value of the parameter θ in case consumers’ and producer’s surplus
are not equally weighted. Here the subsidy paid to the firm is minimal for the
total social welfare to be maximized under the constraint of both consumers’ and
producer’s net gains being nonnegative. Although there are situations where this
minimal amount is equal to the total consumers’ surplus, there are many other sit-
uations which leave a positive portion of the consumers’ surplus to the consumers
themselves.
The B–M restrict themselves to incentive-compatible mechanisms which restric-
tion, of course, leads to no loss of generality in view of the Revelation Principle
(Gibbard 1973; Myerson 1979). Thus the true and reported values of θ coincide
under this mechanism. In a static framework, not only is the true value of this
cost parameter unchangeable but also its reported value is equal to its fixed true
value. Thus once a producer with a particular value of θ is given, the outcome
becomes entirely a function of the regulator’s prior belief. This gives rise to a situ-
ation, where the regulator, the consumers and the producer may regard the density
function f as a “strategic variable”. The positions of the consumers and the firm
regarding this strategic variable differ, of course, due to the asymmetry with respect
to the information about θ . It turns out that both the producer and the consumers
are extremely sensitive to the regulator’s prior beliefs. Besides, the regulator pos-
sesses effective threat points against both the producer and the consumers.
We should note that in the static framework considered there are no past obser-
vations rendering certain probability distributions on [θ0, θ1] superior to others.
Moreover, there is no prior belief which maximizes actual social welfare no matter
what the true value of θ is. Thus any positive probability density function repre-
sents a belief which is as “respectable” as any other. That is, the regulator’s beliefs
are entirely subjective and unaccountable to the public. There is no way of faulting
a regulator for having a particular prior belief rather than another.
We imagine a situation where a subjective probability distribution about the
value of θ is first being formed and then announced to the public prior to the
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implementation of the B–M mechanism. Some may object to this by saying that
in the B–M framework the regulator’s prior belief is not something which is to
be formed and to be made public but it is something which is there and com-
mon knowledge from the outset and thus cannot be considered as a “strategic var-
iable”. A severe criticism to the common knowledge assumption as to the beliefs
of a regulator is available in a recent work of Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), who
argue that “ . . . the entire mechanism design literature, . . . , is based in one way
or another on assumptions like common knowledge that endow the regulator with
information that he cannot have without a contested discovery process that always
leaves him in a state far short of the level of information assumed in these theories.
Common knowledge is the Achilles heel of mechanism design theory.”
Here, it is very difficult for us to conceive of the regulator’s prior belief as a
kind of “law of nature” which is unchangeable, known, and fully agreed upon by
the whole society. Such a strong assumption requires that the society is too well
informed about its lack of information in a single shot without any past observa-
tions about the firm. Letting aside the epistemological question of what the source
of the prior beliefs could be, we admit that our paper would be reduced to a vacu-
ous one in that case. However, in the presence of a self-interest seeking agency who
decides about what the prior belief should be, the assumption about the regulator’s
benevolence becomes a vacuous one. In that case, the floor gets open for manip-
ulating prior beliefs which must be taken into account regarding the question of
what outcome the B–M mechanism will lead to. At this point, we should acknowl-
edge that the manipulability of the subjective prior beliefs of a Bayesian regula-
tor that we make precise in this paper has in fact been conjectured and stressed
for almost 20 years by many economists including Crew and Kleindorfer (1986),
Vogelsang (1988, 2002, 2004), Koray and Sertel (1990) and Koray and Saglam
(1999).
One of the explanations why a regulator with manipulable and unaccountable
beliefs may misrepresent his genuine beliefs to the benefit of an interest group
in the regulated environment is clearly income redistribution. As noted by Crew
and Kleindorfer (2002), “Redistribution by regulation lacked the transparency and
therefore the accountability of traditional methods of taxation and subsidy.” Thus,
a government who can perfectly control the manipulable beliefs of a regulator can
redistribute the expected social surplus between the firm and the consumers in any
way it wishes while simultaneously (pretending to be) maximizing a social objec-
tive function with the predetermined weights of the welfares of the two groups.
Of course, generally governments do not decide on the form of the redistribution
on their own. In our case, one can easily anticipate that once the regulated firm
and the consumers notice that the beliefs of the regulator acting on behalf of the
government are unaccountable to and unverifiable by the public, they may devote
considerable efforts and resources to influence the regulator to make the aforemen-
tioned redistribution work in their direction.
So, our results are consistent with the rent-seeking explanation of monopoly
regulation introduced by the pioneering work of Tullock (1967). If the regulator
(or the governmental body that it represents) is dishonest, it may even demand
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some part of the social surplus as bribe from the firm and/or consumers during
the rent-seeking process. However, the bribe such obtained, though totally unfair,
may not be a (total) loss for the society as a whole, provided that the government
spends or saves it in increasing the wealth of any group in the society including
itself. Indeed, as pointed out by Tullock, there exists a much bigger potential dan-
ger of the rent-seeking process to the society (even in the presence of a honest
and benevolent regulator). Since the firm and the consumers are both sensitive to
the beliefs of the regulator, the resources invested by these two competing interest
groups to influence in their favor the reported belief of a fully uninformed regula-
tor with subject to influence or manipulable beliefs may simply offset each other to
some extent and thus become purely wasteful from the standpoint of the society.
An alternative answer to the question why an honest regulator may manipulate
his belief can be rooted in the “capture theory”. According to the formulation of
Posner (1974), this theory claims that over time regulatory agencies become cap-
tured (provide economic regulation according to the economic laws of supply and
demand) by (to) the politically effective interest groups in the industry. So, the
monopoly regulation problem we are dealing with also admits the possibility that
either the regulated firm or the consumers’ union captures the regulatory agency
to dictate the prior belief the captured regulator should adopt.
We should note that all the results in this paper obtained within a Bayesian
model of monopoly regulation straightforwardly extend to the general Bayesian
framework of Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) which characterizes the complete solu-
tion to a class of principal-agency problems also admitting as special cases the
income tax model of Mirrlees (1971), the quality choice model of the monopolist
of Mussa and Rosen (1978) or Maskin and Riley (1984), and the model of regu-
lating a natural monopolist of Baron and Myerson (1982).
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the B–M model
of monopoly regulation as a well-known example of Bayesian mechanisms. Section
3 contains our results regarding how sensitive the different parties in the regulated
environment are towards the admissible beliefs of the regulator. Finally, Section 4
concludes.
2. A Bayesian Framework: Baron and Myerson’s Optimal Regulatory
Mechanism
Baron and Myerson (1982) considers a model of regulating a natural monopoly
with unknown costs. The firm (producer) has a cost function C(q, θ), where q is
the quantity produced and θ is a cost parameter that is unknown to the regulator.
The firm’s cost function is of the form
C(q, θ)=k + θq if q >0 and C(0, θ)=0, (1)
where θ represents marginal cost and k (a non-negative constant) represents setup
cost of producing any positive output. The parameter k and the form of the cost
function are common knowledge.
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The unknown cost parameter θ is bounded within some interval [θ0, θ1], where
θ0 <θ1. The regulator has prior belief f (θ) about the distribution of the true value
of the cost parameter θ in the interval [θ0, θ1]. The density function f (θ) is positive
and continuous over the interval [θ0, θ1].
The inverse demand function is denoted by P(.), and it is assumed to be nega-
tively sloped. We also assume that the function P(.) is common knowledge.
The total value V (q) of an output of quantity q to consumers is the area under





The consumers’ surplus is V (q)−P(q)q.
A feasible regulatory policy M = (r,p, q, s) consisting of four outcome functions
is defined as follows: For any θ̂ in [θ0, θ1], r(θ̂) is the probability that the producer
is permitted to operate after having reported θ̂ as its cost parameter. As a proba-
bility r(θ̂) should satisfy
0≤ r(θ̂)≤1. (3)
Provided that the producer firm is permitted to operate, the regulated price p(θ̂)






Lastly, s(θ̂)= s∗(θ̂)r(θ̂) is the expected value of the subsidy s∗(θ̂) paid to the pro-
ducer if it is allowed to sell in the regulated market with probability r(θ̂) when it
reports θ̂ .
Let ωp(θ, θ) be the (net) gain of the producer if it truthfully reveals its cost
parameter θ
ωp(θ, θ)= [p(θ)q(θ)− θq(θ)−k]r(θ)+ s(θ) (5)
and let ωp(θ̂, θ) be the gain of the producer if it misreports its cost parameter as
θ̂ , while θ is the true cost parameter
ωp(θ̂, θ)= [p(θ̂)q(θ̂)− θq(θ̂)−k]r(θ̂)+ s(θ̂). (6)




ωp(θ̂ , θ), ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. (7)
Finally the regulator must check that the regulatory policy is individually rational
for a honest producer, that is
ωp(θ)≥0, ∀θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]. (8)
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The feasibility conditions (3), (4), (7) and (8) ensure that the firm honestly
reports its cost parameters.
At the cost report θ the consumers’ (net) gain (the consumers’ surplus net of the
subsidy given to the firm) is denoted by ωc(θ), where
ωc(θ)= [V (q(θ))−p(θ)q(θ)]r(θ)− s(θ).
The social welfare at the cost report θ is denoted by ωs(θ) and defined as a
weighted sum of consumers’ and producer’s net gain:
ωs(θ)=ωc(θ)+α ωp(θ),
where α ∈ [0,1].
Denote the regulatory policy at the belief f as Mf = (rf ,pf , qf , sf ). Then given
the firm’s cost report θ and the regulator’s prior belief f , the producer’s gain, the
consumers’ gain, and the social welfare become ωpf (θ),ω
c




The regulator’s objective is to find a feasible regulatory policy that maximizes




ωsf (θ)f (θ)dθ. (9)
Now assume that θ + (1 − α)F (θ)/f (θ) is nondecreasing in θ .1 Then the optimal
policy M̄f = (r̄f , p̄f , q̄f , s̄f ) to this welfare maximization problem is given by
p̄f (θ)= zα,f (θ) (10)
with
















)− p̄f (θ)q̄f (θ)<k, (13)
s̄f (θ)=
[





r̄f (θ̃ )q̄f (θ̃ )dθ̃ . (14)
1 In fact, B–M does not need this sufficiency assumption on the beliefs that we solely make to
simplify the analysis. B–M characterizes the optimal regulatory policy irrespective of the shape of
the term F(θ)/f (θ).
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As it is clear from (10) to (12), the optimal regulated price is higher than the
marginal cost price unless α = 1, i.e. the consumers’ and the producer’s gains are
equally weighted in the social welfare. In order to understand why this price sched-







r̄f (θ̃ )q̄f (θ̃ )dθ̃ . (15)
We observe that the producer’s gain is increasing in q̄f , the output produced.




)−C(q̄f , θ)]r̄f (θ)− (1−α)ω̄pf (θ) (16)
we note the tradeoff between the efficiency and the incentives, which should be
given to the producer. So, in order to limit the information rents of the producer,
the optimal price is set above the marginal cost.
Equation (13) shows that the producer is allowed to produce only if the con-
sumers’ surplus at the reported cost is sufficiently high to cover the adjusted setup
cost of production. Finally, we note that the optimal subsidy in (14) is composed
of two parts: The integral part (given the other part) guarantees truthful revelation
while the nonintegral part ensures that the producer will not make losses when he
is allowed to produce.
3. Preferences on Beliefs
The optimal regulatory policy presented in Section 2 depends upon the prior belief
of the regulator about the unknown cost parameter. This prior belief is assumed
to be common knowledge, i.e. it is publicly known to both the consumers and the
regulated producer. Here, what is restrictive is not that the regulator’s announced
belief is commonly shared by the society. Nowadays, extensively used public trans-
mission and communication tools enable a credible regulator to make the public
believe whatever he believes. Indeed, it is this very power of the regulator that is
quite disturbing as the regulator can instead make the public believe whatever he
pretends to believe. This may be a stronger case if the belief of the regulator does
not derive from an objective structure or some past observations about the cost.
When the belief of the regulator reflects his subjective evaluations and hence is
not completely verifiable by the society, the outcome of the regulatory mechanism
is not predictable. The regulator with a manipulable belief becomes open to influ-
ence by the interest groups, the producer or the consumers, who may engage in
costly rent-seeking activity to sway the regulator to their point of view. Below, we
will make explicit how sensitive the welfares of these rent-seeking groups are to the
regulator’s prior belief.
We consider a Borel field T on the type space [θ0, θ1] and regard the subset A of
probability measures on T with densities that are strictly positive at each element
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of [θ0, θ1] as the set of admissible prior beliefs for the regulator. Obviously, the set
A which the regulator may choose his belief from is a rich continuum.
In the set of probability measures T there exists another continuum, so known
as Dirac delta functions, which are of particular interest for our analysis.
Definition 1: The regulator completely knows that θ = θ̂ if he has the belief repre-
sented by the Dirac delta function δ(θ − θ̂ ), which is defined as
δ(θ − θ̂ )=0 if θ = θ̂ , and
∫ θ1
θ0
δ(θ − θ̂ )dθ =1. (17)
Notice that δ(θ − θ̂ ) /∈ A, i.e. the Dirac delta function is not an admissible belief
since it is not a probability density function. Indeed, if the regulator was allowed
to have as his belief a probability mass function (Dirac delta function) then the
need for Bayesian regulation would cease to exist. However, one should still pay
attention to the probability mass functions since in the continuum of admissible
beliefs there exist ones that are arbitrarily close to δ(θ − θ̂ ) for all values of θ̂ in
[θ0, θ1]. One can naturally ask how the outcome of the B–M mechanism would
change under beliefs which are arbitrarily close to functions representing the truth.
To answer this question, we should first find out how the several parties in the
economy rank different beliefs.
We index the set of representative agents for the three interest groups—the soci-
ety, the consumers, and the producer in the regulated economy - by {s, c,p}.
Definition 2: Let f,f ′ ∈ A. The belief f is preferred to f ′ by the representative
agent i under the optimal regulatory policy M̄f if there exists [θ ′0, θ
′
1]⊂ [θ0, θ1] such
that ω̄if (θ)≥ ω̄if ′(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] and ω̄if (θ)> ω̄if ′(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ ′0, θ ′1].
Our first result below considers whether there is a most preferred belief in the
view of the consumers and the society.
Proposition 1: Let f ∈A. Under the optimal regulatory policy M̄f no belief in A is
preferred to f by the society or the consumers.
Proof: Suppose there exists f ′ ∈A that is preferred to f by agent s (representing








implying that M̄f is not optimal, which is a contradiction. That the consumers do
not prefer f ′ to f follows from the fact that ω̄s = ω̄c for α =0. 
We will show that on the producer’s side the situation seems to differ. The net
gain (the information rent) accruing to the producer is extremely sensitive to the
regulator’s belief through the term F(θ)/f (θ), so known as the “inverse of the
reverse hazard rate”. Now, we introduce a well-known dominance of beliefs.
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Definition 3: Consider two beliefs f1, f2 ∈T . The belief f1 stochastically dominates
(in the inverse of the reverse hazard rate) f2 if there exists [θ ′0, θ
′
1] ⊂ [θ0, θ1] such
that F1(θ)/f1(θ)≤F2(θ)/f2(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1] and F1(θ)/f1(θ)<F2(θ)/f2(θ) for
all θ ∈ [θ ′0, θ ′1].
We can state the following relation between our stochastic dominance concept
and preferences of the monopoly over the beliefs.
Proposition 2: Let f1, f2 ∈A be such that zα,f1(θ), zα,f2(θ) are non-decreasing in θ
and f1 stochastically dominates f2. Then the producer prefers f1 to f2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 shows that there are admissible beliefs which lead to outcomes
arbitrarily close to the most preferred outcome for the producer.
Proposition 3: There exists a sequence of beliefs {f1, f2, . . . , f∞} such that fj ∈A,










f (θ), for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1].
Proof: See Appendix A.
A sequence of beliefs admitted by Proposition 3 (as its proof suggests) is
{f εj (θ)}∞j=1, where ε ∈ (0,1) and
f εj (θ)=
1/εj exp(θ/εj )
exp(θ1/εj )− exp(θ0/εj )
.
The limit of this sequence is δ(θ − θ1), an inadmissible belief, which stochastically
dominates any admissible belief. So, the above sequence yields in the limit to the
producer a gain arbitrarily close to the supremum of w̄p(θ) for its cost report θ .
That is, the producer gains most if the regulator believes or pretends to believe
that the producer is almost the least efficient type.
Although no belief is ex-post superior to another one from the viewpoint of
either the consumers or the society for all realizations of the cost parameter, the
below result establishes that by a suitable choice of the regulator’s belief the social
welfare and consumers’ gain can be made arbitrarily close to zero unless the firm
has the most efficient cost parameter θ0. Besides, under such a belief if θ =θ0 then
both the society and the consumers gain almost as much as what they would do
under complete information. On the opposite side, for the same class of beliefs the
information rent of the firm may be reduced down sufficiently close to zero for all
realizations of the cost parameter, even for θ0.
Proposition 4: There exists a sequence of beliefs {f1, f2, . . . , f∞} such that fj ∈A,
zα,fj (θ) is non-decreasing in θ for all j , and limj→∞ fj (θ)= δ(θ − θ0). Then
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inff ∈A ω̄if (θ) if θ ∈ (θ0, θ1],
supf ∈A ω̄if (θ) if θ = θ0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Note from the proof of the above proposition that the sequence of beliefs
{gεj (θ)}∞j=1 where ε ∈ (0,1) and
gεj (θ)=
1/εj exp(−θ/εj )
exp(−θ0/εj )− exp(−θ1/εj )
converges to δ(θ − θ0), the truth about θ0. One can show that this limiting (and
inadmissible) belief is stochastically dominated by any admissible belief. It follows
that if θ = θ0, the producer, the consumers, and the society as a whole can be
made to gain almost nil when the regulator pretends to believe that the producer
is almost the most efficient type.
When the objective of the consumers changes from maximizing their ex-post
gain to maximizing their ex-ante gain over the admissible set of preferences, we
obtain another interesting result. First notice that among all social welfare func-
tions the consumers most prefer the one which assigns zero weight to the pro-
ducer’s gain (α=0 case). One then wonders whether for every given belief f ∈A of
the regulator there exists another belief fα ∈A such that the expected value under
the belief fα of the social welfare function that assigns the weight α to the pro-
ducer’s gain is the same as the expected consumers’ gain under the regulator’s orig-
inal belief f .
To answer this question, we note that for any belief f ∈A such that F(θ)/f (θ)






)−C(q̄f , zα,f (θ))]r̄f (θ)f (θ)dθ − (1−α)ω̄pf (θ1), (18)
where s̄(θ1) can be chosen so as to make ω̄
p
f (θ1)=0. So, the expected consumers’
gain under the belief f is equal to the expected social welfare under the belief fα






Rearranging the above equality yields
fα(θ)
Fα(θ)
= (1−α) f (θ)
F (θ)
,
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which implies Fα(θ)=F(θ)1−α and finally
fα(θ)= (1−α)F (θ)−αf (θ).
We can now formally state the above findings.
Proposition 5: For any belief f ∈ A such that F(θ)/f (θ) is non-decreasing and







The above results indicate that the regulator can, by a suitable choice of beliefs,
redistribute the expected social surplus between the firm and the consumers
according to the wishes of the government that it represents, while at the same
time seeming to maximize the social objective function along with the weights of
the welfares of the firm and the consumers predetermined by the legislation. It
may even be the case that the regulator is “captured” by either the firm or the
consumers and simply adopts the most desirable belief from the viewpoint of the
interest group that it implicitly represents.
Even if the regulator does not have any ultimate goal of redistributing the social
welfare or he is not wholly captured by any particular group in the regulated envi-
ronment, one cannot deny the clear fact that the sensitivity of all the interest
groups in the society to the regulator’s manipulable beliefs renders the regulator
open to influence by rent-seekers, including the consumers’ union and the regu-
lated firm. Moreover, the regulator might himself be a rent-seeker in this process if
he demands/receives bribe from the regulated firm or the consumers in return for
manipulating his beliefs. Here one should note that any belief of the regulator in
the set A is equally admissible (and hence bribing is proved only with “corpus de-
licti”, when the person attempting to bribe is caught on the site at the moment of
offering or receiving the money).2 The regulator preferably takes the bribe before
he announced his prior belief and the monopolist reported its cost parameter, thus
the bribe paid by the firm or consumers does not change the form of the optimal
regulatory policy. However, with bribery taking place the social welfare reported
to the public decreases as the regulator’s gain from manipulation has no positive
weight assigned in the social welfare function.
Here, we find ourselves faced with a bargaining problem under asymmetric
information. The firm reports its cost parameter θ after the regulator announced
2 Here we should also note that prohibiting certain beliefs to be owned by the regulator does not
cure manipulation, because for any belief in the dense set A, there exists another one which yields
almost the same regulatory outcome.
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his belief, thus the regulator does not know the actual range of the bribe that he
can extract from the regulated agents. The firm may decline to bribe if what the
regulator demands from the firm (the consumers) is too high with respect to the
producer’s gain (the consumers’ gain). The regulator if he commits to his threat
would then announce the worst belief from the viewpoint of the firm (the con-
sumers) so that the firm would produce (the consumers would buy) nil almost at
any marginal cost. Such a case, of course, is not desirable for either the society or
the regulator. All in all, one can regretfully say that “the fish stinks from the head
down”. The presence of a regulator with manipulable beliefs renders the regulatory
mechanism prone to the rent-seeking of the regulator as well, and the associated
‘rent-seeking solution’, whose characterization is outside the scope of this paper,
will, in general, differ from what the B–M regulatory mechanism predicts.
A final remark to make is that both B–M results and the results that our anal-
ysis lead to strongly depend upon the asymmetry of information about the true
value of the cost parameter. The firm is assumed to have complete information
about it whereas neither the regulator nor the consumers are allowed to do so. So,
we only compare the outcomes under the above informational structure with those
under incomplete information from the viewpoints of all the parties involved, i.e.,
the consumers, the monopolistic firm and the society as a whole. This comparison
naturally leads to the result that the uninformed parties—the consumers and the
society as a whole—prefer complete information to incomplete while the firm pre-
fers to keep its cost characteristics as private information until the regulator’s prior
belief is announced and thus becomes binding. This situation, of course, creates
incentives for the uninformed parties to gain more information about the firm’s
cost parameter at the stage prior to the enforcement of the mechanism if they can
do so.3
4. Conclusions
Dealing with the B–M scheme of monopoly regulation, a well-known representa-
tive of Bayesian mechanisms, we have established that both the regulated firm and
the consumers are sensitive to the regulator’s prior belief about the firm’s private
cost parameter. Although there is neither a best nor a worst prior belief for the
firm due to the structure of the class of functions to which prior beliefs are sup-
posed to belong, it turns out that there are beliefs, which lead to outcomes arbi-
trarily close to the most preferred or to the least preferred outcome for the firm,
rendering the firm extremely sensitive to what the prior belief of the regulator is.
3 Koray and Saglam (2004) examine whether the regulated agent may have any incentive to signal
his private information so as to change the regulator’s belief. An interesting result they obtain is
that more information about the regulated agent is not always desired and valued by the society
or the principal (i.e. consumers in the monopoly regulation problem).
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On the other hand, from the consumers’ viewpoint there is no prior belief dom-
inating others, that is leading to an actual consumers’ surplus which is higher
than those resulting from other prior beliefs no matter what the true value of the
firm’s cost parameter is. Nevertheless, for every prior belief of the regulator there
exists another one, such that a regulator possessing that prior belief would end
up maximizing the expected value of the consumers’ surplus evaluated according
to the former belief under the B–M mechanism. Thus consumers who somehow
know and agree with the regulator’s prior belief would still wish that the regula-
tor behaved as if he had the latter prior belief. Moreover, the regulator possesses
admissible beliefs inducing values of net consumers’ gain as close to nil as we wish
irrespective of the value of θ . All in all, the consumers are not impartial towards
the regulator’s prior belief either.
Our findings are consistent with both capture theory and rent-seeking explana-
tions of monopoly regulation and suggest the need to exercise care in using the
insights and results of Bayesian regulatory theory to inform practice.
Our results on Bayesian mechanisms also contribute to the ongoing debate
between Bayesian and non-Bayesian approach in regulation. Non-Bayesian mech-
anisms are dynamic price adjustment rules that use the observable and verifiable
data on the regulated industry. Among such mechanisms (regulating a monopoly),
the pioneering scheme of Loeb and Magat (1979) entitles the firm to the whole
social surplus and thus ensures the first-best optimum in a single period unlike
the other non-Bayesian mechanisms, though at the expense of an utter inequity
in the society. The Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) scheme by Sappington and
Sibley (1988) refines the Loeb and Magat scheme by taxing away the surplus the
firm receives after one period. The outcome of this mechanism converges to the
first-best optimum in the second period. The adjustment mechanism proposed by
Finsinger and Vogelsang (F–V) (1982) uses an observable approximation to the
consumer surplus change offered to the regulated firm. The F–V scheme, which is
otherwise quite similar to the ISS scheme, only leads to a convergence to the first-
best optimum in the long-run. The F–V scheme gives the firm incentives to incur
purely wasteful expenditures in early periods, while this serious drawback of the
scheme is overcome in a refinement due to Hagerman (1990) with the introduction
of service payments. Generally, the pricing rules that non-Bayesian mechanisms
suggest do not maximize a well-defined multi-period social welfare function, and
the convergence under these mechanisms to the optimum of the associated single-
shot regulation problem is not immediate. One can nevertheless evaluate the rel-
ative welfare performance of non-Bayesian mechanisms as in the work of Lyon
(1996).
While the Bayesian approach in regulation always leads to the (incomplete infor-
mation) optimum, it has been criticized for its unrealistic Bayesian description
of asymmetric information. Indeed, what this paper makes precise is an already
known conjecture that the beliefs of a Bayesian regulator, hence the outcome they
lead to, are manipulable. Along the same direction, Crew and Kleindorfer (2002)
(C–K) also criticize the Bayesian approach for it does not make explicit the deriva-
tion of the probability density function representing the regulator’s prior belief and
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for it conceives the regulator’s prior belief as common knowledge. Both C–K and
Vogelsang (2004) make a further criticism of the Bayesian approach in its granting
an unrealistic ability to the regulator to concede some (theoretically unavoidable)
information rents to the regulated firm(s). The C–K also criticizes another unques-
tioned condition for the efficiency of the Bayesian approach, namely the commit-
ment of the regulator to the original regulatory scheme guaranteeing non-negative
information rents to the regulated agent after revealing his private information.
Besides its undesired aspects, the Bayesian approach in regulation also has some
qualitative results that are discussed at length in Vogelsang (2004). An invaluable
insight that we have learned in the last two decades is that information rent as well
as the cost-reducing effort of the regulated firm should be increasing in its innate
efficiency. An equally strong recommendation is that increasing regulatory commit-
ment is desirable and renegotiation of the information rents promised to the firm
is generally not optimal. Considering the shortcomings of the Bayesian approach
noted in this paper and the recognized efficiency drawbacks of existing implement-
able non-Bayesian mechanisms regulatory economists are left with something of a
quandary. Perhaps the view expressed by Vogelsang (2004) represents the appropri-
ate middle-ground to which these results naturally lead, namely that “the results
from the Bayesian literature could determine the design of non-Bayesian mecha-
nisms and the choice among several non-Bayesian mechanisms.”
Appendix A








with θ∗f = max {θ ∈ [θ0, θ1]|r̄f (θ)=1}, where
r̄f (θ)=
{
1 if f (θ)≥0,
0 if f (θ)<0
and f (θ) = V
(
q̄f (θ)
) − p̄f (θ)q̄f (θ) − k. Differentiating f (θ) with respect to
zα,f (θ) we get
∂f (θ)
∂zα,f (θ)
=−q̄f (θ) ∂p̄f (θ)
∂zα,f (θ)
<0,






So, θ∗f is non-increasing in F(θ)/f (θ). Therefore, ω
p
f (θ) is non-increasing in
F(θ)/f (θ), and the producer prefers f1 to f2.
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Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the sequence {f εj (θ)}∞j=1, where ε ∈ (0,1) and
f εj (θ)=
1/εj exp(θ/εj )
exp(θ1/εj )− exp(θ0/εj )
.
We will show that the limit of this sequence, an inadmissible belief, stochastically





















f (θ), for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1],
since ∂ω̄pf (θ)/∂ zα,f (θ) ≤ 0 for all f ∈ A, limj→∞ zα,f εj (θ) = limj→∞ θ + (1 − α)
F εj (θ)/f
ε




f εj (θ) = lim
j→∞
1/εj exp(θ/εj )
















exp((θ1 − θ)h)(θ1 − θ)(θ1 − θ0)
= δ(θ − θ1)
since we also have Fεj (θ1)−Fεj (θ0)=1 for all j .
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the sequence {gεj (θ)}∞j=1, where ε ∈ (0,1) and
gεj (θ)=
1/εj exp(−θ/εj )
exp(−θ0/εj )− exp(−θ1/εj )
.
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We will show that the limit of this sequence (an inadmissible belief) is stochasti-
cally dominated by any admissible belief. First observe
lim
j→∞
gεj (θ) = lim
j→∞
1/εj exp(−θ/εj )
















(θ − θ0) exp((θ − θ0)/h)
= δ(θ − θ0)























f (θ), for all θ ∈ [θ0, θ1],
since ∂ω̄pf (θ)/∂ zα,f (θ) ≤ 0 for all f ∈ A, limj→∞ zα,gεj (θ) = limj→∞ θ + (1 − α)
Gεj (θ)/g
ε
j (θ)=∞= supf ∈A zα,f (θ) for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1]. (Note that limj→∞ q̄gεj (θ)=0
for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1] also implies limj→∞ ω̄pgεj (θ0)=0.)
That limj→∞ q̄gεj (θ) = 0 for all θ ∈ (θ0, θ1] altogether with limj→∞ q̄gεj (θ0) =
P −1(θ0) proves part (ii) of the proposition.
References
Baron, D., and R. B. Myerson. 1982. “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs.” Econometrica
50: 911–930.
Crew, M. A., and P. R. Kleindorfer. 1986. The Economics of Public Utility Regulation. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Crew, M. A., and P. R. Kleindorfer. 2002. “Regulatory Economics: Twenty Years of Progress?” Journal
of Regulatory Economics 21: 5–22.
Finsinger, J., and I. Vogelsang. 1982. “Performance Indices for Public Enterprises.” In Public Enterprise
in Less Developed Countries, edited by L. P. Jones. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gibbard, A. 1973. “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica 41: 587–602.
Guesnerie, R., and J. J. Laffont. 1984. “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent
Problems with an Application to the Control of a Self-Managed Firm.” Journal of Public Economics
25: 329–369.
THE NEED FOR REGULATING A BAYESIAN REGULATOR 21
Hagerman, J. 1990. “Regulation by Price Adjustment.” The RAND Journal of Economics 21: 72–82.
Koray, S., and M. R. Sertel. 1990. “Pretend-but-Perform Regulation and Limit Pricing.” European Jour-
nal of Political Economy 6: 451–472.
Koray, S., and I. Saglam. 1999. “Bayesian Regulatory Mechanisms: Corruption and Learning.” In Con-
temporary Economic Issues. Volume 4: Economic Behavior and Design, edited by M. Kaser and M. R.
Sertel. London: MacMillan Press.
Koray, S., and I. Saglam. 2004. “Learning in Bayesian Regulatory Mechanisms.” Mimeo.
Loeb, M., and W. A. Magat 1979. “A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation.” Journal of Law and
Economics 22: 399–404.
Lyon, T. P. 1996. “Evaluating the Performance of Non-Bayesian Regulatory Mechanisms.” Journal of
Regulatory Economics 9: 41–60.
Maskin, E., and J. Riley. 1984. “Monopoly With Incomplete Information.” The Rand Journal of Eco-
nomics 15: 171–196.
Mirrlees, J. 1971. “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation.” Review of Economic
Studies 38: 175–208.
Mussa, M., and S. Rosen. 1978. “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic Theory 18: 301–
317.
Myerson, R. B. 1979. “Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 47: 61–74.
Posner, R. A. 1974. “Theories of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics 5: 335–358.
Sappington, D. and D. Sibley. 1988. “Regulating Without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus
Subsidy Scheme.” International Economic Review 29: 297–306.
Tullock, G. 1967. “The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.” Western Economic Journal 5:
224–232.
Vogelsang, I. 1988. “A Little Paradox in the Design of Regulatory Mechanisms.” International Economic
Review 29: 467–476.
Vogelsang, I. 2002. “Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: A 20-Year Per-
spective.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 22: 5–27.
Vogelsang, I. 2004. “Transmission Pricing and Performance-Based Regulation,” presented at Carnegie-
Mellon Conference on Electricity Transmission in Deregulated Markets: Challenges, Opportunities,
and Necessary R&D Agenda: Pittsburgh, December.
